Factors affecting the probability of bankruptcy: a panel data approach by Sundal, Håkon Kambestad & Hatlestad, Karoline
 Factors Affecting the Probability 
of Bankruptcy 
A panel data approach 
 
Håkon Kambestad Sundal & Karoline Hatlestad 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Kai Liu 
Master thesis in Economic Analysis and Finance 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are 
responsible − through the approval of this thesis − for the theories and methods used, or 
results and conclusions drawn in this work. 
Norwegian School of Economics  
Bergen, spring semester 2015 
 
 2 
 3 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the importance of firm-specific factors in determining or explaining 
bankruptcy. By studying Norwegian firms from the period 2005-2012, we are able to 
examine this using binary regression models. First, we identified potential financial 
measures we believed to be associated with business failure. Then we selected 15 of these 
that are potentially correlated with the occurrence of bankruptcy along with 3 firm-specific 
characteristics. These measures were incorporated into different econometric models. During 
analysis, the 15 financial measures were reduced to 5: Two profitability measures, two 
solidity measures and one liquidity measure. We conclude that fixed effects are present in 
the data. Controlling for them enables us to identify the impact of accounting ratios on the 
probability of a bankruptcy more efficiently. In the logistic regression only two profitability 
measures remain significant, yet when we construct a prediction model for business failure 
this model has an overall accuracy of 74 %. Thus, we are also confident that incorporating 
firm-specific effects in the model enables us to identify good measures of how accounting 
data affects the probability of bankruptcy.  
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1. Introduction 
Looking into the future, at least doing it with statistical confidence, is very difficult. There 
are always some elements we cannot foresee. Such is the nature of life. More to the point, 
this is also the nature of companies. Therefore, accurately predicting corporate bankruptcy is 
inherently difficult. The literature lists an incredible range of factors that affect the financial 
state of a company including, but not limited to, factors such as the internal processes (Zhu, 
2012), liquidity (Bernanke, 1981), competition in the market (Webb, 1980) and macro-
economic conditions (Bhattacharjee, et.al., 2009).  
Being able to identify the most important factors in estimating bankruptcies can yield 
valuable information, especially regarding the population of firms in Norway. What decides 
the default of a company can differ across cultures. As such, this knowledge can be put to 
further use upon specifying new models for the actual forecasting of bankruptcies within the 
population.  
Different factors explain the variation in different subpopulations. Given all these factors, we 
are interested in providing some new insight into Norwegian data in particular. The latest 
authoritative paper on the subject of estimating bankruptcy probabilities in large Norwegian 
datasets was one by Bernhardsen (2001), which we will discuss in more detail further on. 
Even so, since then society has been rapidly modernized and we have had periods of 
financial distress. In addition, software packages and hardware have been developed to 
accommodate the use of even larger datasets and more demanding estimation techniques. 
We therefore think a new estimation will add to what we already know about bankruptcies as 
a phenomenon. The main research questions that we try to shed light on are:  
• How can we best measure the effect of financial factors that determine a bankruptcy? 
• How does fixed effects influence the estimation approach?	  
	  
This thesis is developed on Norwegian data, and is specifically related to the Norwegian 
spread of bankruptcies. To be able to contribute with new insights we want to take the panel 
data structure of our data into consideration. Our intuition is that using a good regression 
based model on a large dataset should yield accurate insight as to how near a firm is to being 
insolvent if the model is well specified. While we will admit that the latter might be beyond 
the scope of this thesis, we nevertheless discover evidence that the use of panel data 
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approaches can change the interpretation of what factors determine a bankruptcy. We seek to 
control for these fixed effects that may be present on a firm specific level. These effects 
could be anything but say they are managerial capabilities, in which case a panel data 
approach should be better. This is something we have not found done yet in the literature, 
probably due to the widespread use of logistic regression, whose fixed effects estimations are 
very computationally demanding and therefore less used. 
Why some businesses are more exposed will be valuable information for both a firm and 
creditors. A firm would receive input about what measures heightens the risk of a default and 
be able to improve on these. Any financial institution that provide credit for a company will 
need input on calculating this risk in order to calculate the interest rates they should charge, 
so they can maximize their profit and minimize losses. The information could also be useful 
to decision makers on a macro-level during times of distress when companies will be cutting 
costs and hoarding equity, whilst unions will underline the importance of employment as 
firms let go off staff. 
Chapter 2 will give an overview and some definitions of the term bankruptcy in relation to 
Norwegian market conditions, legislation and cyclical variation. Chapter 3 describes what 
we feel is the most authoritative literature on this subject in regards to our own paper, 
specifically Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Skogsvik (1988) and Bernhardsen (2001). 
Chapter 4 consists of descriptive statistics and an overview of our dataset. The primary key 
figures in determining bankruptcy are also derived in this chapter. Furthermore, in chapter 5 
the process of selecting and estimating coefficients for our key variables is shown. In order 
to do so we make use of the ordinary least squares model, random and fixed effect models 
and logistic regression. The results and analyses from these estimations are also in this 
chapter. Lastly, in chapter six, we use the most efficient model to predict estimated 
probabilities and evaluating them.  
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2. Bankruptcies in Norway and economic cycles 
Filing for bankruptcy is something both private persons and companies can do if they are not 
able to meet their financial obligations. This thesis focuses on bankruptcies in regards to 
companies. As of late, market conditions in Norway are experiencing changes. The oil sector 
has been affected by a sudden drop in oil prices. Seeing how the Norwegian economy is 
tightly connected to how the oil sector performs, this is an interesting time to be able to 
identify the real drivers of bankruptcy as firms are under financial pressure and some will be 
more inclined towards failure.  
2.1 The Norwegian legislation 
The Norwegian law states that if a debtor is insolvent then bankruptcy proceedings are 
initiated (The Bankruptcy act, 1984, § 60.). Creditors or claimants may petition a bankruptcy 
proceeding, if the debtor is not able to meet their claims. 
The Norwegian law defines insolvent §61: 
According to §61 (The Bankruptcy act, 1984, § 61.), the debtor is insolvent when they are 
not able to meet their financial obligations. The debtor cannot be considered insolvent if the 
value of their belongings covers the value of their debt. The insolvency must not be 
considered temporary, and the debtor must struggle to meet their obligations when they are 
due. 
The legislation regarding limited companies includes an act of requirements to the 
companies’ liquidity. One relevant paragraph here is § 3-4 “Requirement of adequate equity” 
which states that the company shall at all times have an equity and liquidity which is 
adequate in terms of the risk and scope of the company’s business (The Norwegian Public 
Limited Liability Companies Act, 1997, § 3-4). 
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2.2 Reasons for bankruptcies 
Surviving in a competitive market is a challenge for many companies. In financial 
recessions, it is observed that more companies experience financial stress that sometimes 
leads to bankruptcy. Companies may have difficulties adapting to financial stress and not be 
able to make the necessary adjustments in their costs. Even companies that provide good 
products and have large earnings struggle if they are not liquid enough. The balancing 
between investing in the company and having liquidity to meet their obligations is a 
challenge. Capital-effective industries require more available liquidity than labour-effective 
industries, so there may be differences between sectors. 
Another event that leads to bankruptcies are acts of criminal activity. Although this is not 
very common, it happens from time to time that companies are exposed to fraud. Being 
subjected to a scam that largely affects a company’s financial state could initiate a down 
spiralling period. Especially if the company is not able to win potential law suits, and must 
consider the loss a sunk cost. This could be fraud related to investments, misleading the 
company in business deals, not delivering products as agreed on etc. Internal controlling is 
also important to avoid criminal activities within the company. Having trustworthy and loyal 
employees is crucial for companies, as the employees often have access to finances and 
reporting systems. Embezzlement is a risk for every company that has disloyal staff, and this 
could be difficult to discover if the same people are in charge of reporting. Although this is 
obviously illegal, it still happens.  
Distributing the risk of losses is important to companies. If a company base their entire 
income on a few custumers or projects, they may experience significant percentage-wise 
losses if something goes wrong. It is like putting all the eggs in one basket, and single cases 
could destroy companies. If a company makes a mistake in a case like this, they could end 
up in a lawsuit that they are not able to handle in terms of compensation costs. Depending on 
what industry the company operates in these risks should be taken into account on different 
levels.  
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2.3 Stigma of going bankrupt 
The general opinion in the public about bankruptcies differs through cultures. We have the 
impression that some cultures are more accepting and less negative towards bankruptcies 
than others are. E.g. the United States is considered more liberal in regards to this than 
Norway, and it is more common to file for bankruptcy in the US. There are many 
contributing factors to this, and the fact that bankruptcy proceedings are met with a 
stigmatization in Norway could be a reason. This stigma towards failing companies has 
historically been very common. The situation has improved, but a survey done by Deloitte 
(Helsingeng, 2004) claims that 75 % of managers still find a stigma attached to going 
bankrupt. In addition to this, other economic perspectives contribute to why the Norwegian 
market is different from others.   
2.4 Consequences of bankruptcy 
When a company goes bankrupt, it has many repercussions. The company must file for 
bankruptcy when they are not able to meet their financial obligations. Creditors are therefore 
one of the parties that are highly affected. If the company has any debt or other financial 
obligations, the creditors are at risk of losing this value. Creditors often have models that 
calculate the probability of bankruptcy times the potential loss, and incorporate this into their 
strategy of lending. The cost of borrowing capital often is calculated with regards to this risk. 
Nevertheless, an unexpected failure of a company could provide major losses. Other 
suppliers that provide the company with goods and products are also in danger of not 
receiving payment for what they have delivered. 
Customers and business partners of a company that goes bankrupt could be affected by a 
bankruptcy. When a company files for bankruptcy, it terminates the operations. Contracts 
that the company entered previously may not be fulfilled. This leads to financial and 
operational consequences for those involved. When the company has to terminate its 
operations, there are often many employees that lose their jobs. In recessions, this is 
particularly a problem as the employee can encounter difficulties in finding another job. As 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the bankruptcy rates and the unemployment rates are following a 
similar pattern. This trend may be due to macroeconomic conditions that are influencing 
both the bankruptcy rate, and the unemployment rate. 
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Figure 1: Bankruptcies in Norway 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment rate Norway 
 
(Statistics Norway 1 & 2 (SSB), 2015) 
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The social cost of bankruptcy is related to the unemployment rate. If people are losing their 
jobs and are not able to find a new source of income they rely on the benefits that they get 
from the state. If many people are unemployed, it becomes a large expenditure on people 
that are healthy, fit to work and involuntary unemployed.  
2.5 Cycles in the economy 
There will always be fluctuations in an economy known as business cycles.  There are 
periods of strong growth, and other periods with decreases in the growth. These periods are 
called recessions and expansion of the economy. The growth is in real terms (inflation 
adjusted) and can be measured by the GDP and unemployment rates. In recession periods, 
the general income falls. This is a negative effect for companies, as people have less 
available capital to spend. The income of businesses will therefore also be decreased in 
periods like this. It is especially in these difficult circumstances companies have to be alert 
of the risks of going bankrupt.  
 
Figure 3: Business cycle 
:  
(Business cycles, n.d.) 
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3. Previous research 
In this chapter, we want to give an overview of previous literature on the topic of estimating 
bankruptcies that we find relevant to our thesis. This will give an historical retrospective 
look at bankruptcy prediction. There have been many studies on this topic over the years, 
and we will present a selection of these. The literature is meant to be helpful in 
understanding our research and results. The studies that we have selected were chosen due to 
their different characteristics in the method used and variable selection. We want to develop 
our models based on a combination of these features, and supply them with our own ideas. 
The following literature is used as a base in our model building process.  
3.1 Altman’s discriminant analysis 
In 1968 Altman constructed a model to predict bankruptcy with a multiple discriminant 
analysis (MDA). Altman found that ratios measuring profitability, liquidity and solvency 
were the most significant factors in predicting bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). By developing 
this model, the goal was to find what weights each of these factors should have when 
predicting bankruptcy, i.e. how much these factors impact the probability of going bankrupt.  
The multiple discriminant analysis that was used in this study is a statistical technique for 
solving a two-class problem (Sundaram, n.d). MDA will find characteristics that are similar 
within the groups. Altman established two groups with 33 bankrupt firms in one, and 33 
non-bankrupt firms in the other. This technique will then derive a linear combination of 
these characteristics which "best" discriminates between the groups (Altman, 1968 p. 592).   
This model includes five financial ratios, and the MDA derives coefficients for each of the 
ratios. When inputting the financial numbers of a company in the model, it gives a total Z-
score that implies the companies’ probability of failure. If the models output is a Z-score 
below 1.81, the company have high probability of bankruptcy.  A score between 1.81 and 3.0 
is a “grey zone” and a score over 3.0 is a sign of a solid business.   
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Z is given by: 
Z= 1.2𝑿𝟏+ 1.4𝑿𝟐 +3.3 𝑿𝟑+ 0.6𝑿𝟒 + 1.0𝑿𝟓 
 𝑿𝟏 = Working capital/total assets 𝑿𝟐 = Retained earnings/total assets 𝑿𝟑 = EBIT/total assets 𝑿𝟒 = Market value equity/ book value of total debt 𝑿𝟓 = Sales/total assets 
(Altman, 1968) 
3.2 Ohlsons logistic regression model 
Ohlson contributed to the research in 1980 with his logistic regression model (logit model) 
for bankruptcy prediction. Ohlson based his model on a larger sample of companies than 
Altman, with over 2000 individual companies in his dataset. Ohlson explains four different 
factors he found statistically significant in affecting the probability of failure 1) the size of 
the company, 2) a measure of financial structure, 3) a measure of performance and 4) a 
measure of liquidity (Ohlson, 1980).  
Using the logit model for prediction, Ohlson was able to find a model that predicts a 
percentage probability of a firm going bankrupt, since the dependent variable of the logit 
model is binominal. Ohlson argues that this model gives statistically lower error-rates than 
previous studies, e.g. Altman (Ohlson, 1980, p. 111). Ohlson chose nine financial ratios that 
he includes in his model, and these were selected for simplicity reasons. In his study Ohlson 
pinpoints that for his subset the financial state variables (1-4) are uncorrelated with the 
performance variables (5-9), which supports the notion that both sets are important for the 
predictive relationship. 
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The model is given by: 𝒁 =   𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬+   𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑻𝑳𝑻𝑨+ 𝜷𝟑 ∗𝑾𝑪𝑻𝑨+ 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑪𝑳𝑪𝑨+ 𝜷𝟓 ∗ 𝑶𝑬𝑵𝑬𝑮+ 𝜷𝟔∗𝑵𝑰𝑻𝑨+ 𝜷𝟕 ∗ 𝑭𝑼𝑻𝑳+ 𝜷𝟖 ∗ 𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑾𝑶+   𝜷𝟗 ∗ 𝑪𝑯𝑰𝑵+ 𝜺 
SIZE = log (total assets/GNP price-level index) 
TLTA = Total liabilities divided by total assets 
WCTA = Working capital divided by total assets 
CLCA = Current liabilities divided by current assets 
OENEG = One if total liabilities exceeds total assets, zero otherwise 
NITA = Net income divided by total assets. 
FUTL = Funds provided by operations divided by total liabilities 
INTWO = One if net income was negative for the last two years, zero otherwise. 
CHIN =(𝑁𝐼! −   𝑁𝐼!!!)/( 𝑁𝐼! + 𝑁𝐼!!! ) where 𝑁𝐼! is the net income for the most recent 
period. The denominator acts as a level indicator. The variable intends to measure change in 
net income (Ohlson, 1980, p. 118).  
3.3 Skogsvik- Financial stress 
Kenth Skogsvik wrote a research paper in 1988 on predicting when companies are in 
financial distress. He has based his analysis on the probit model. This is similar to the logit 
model and it is also a binary prediction model. The output is a percentage probability of 
financial stress within a company. Included in this work is an analysis of inflation-adjusted 
figures, and this differs his work from previous research. The aim of his research was to 
investigate whether the inflation-adjusted numbers gave a better prediction when the 
accounting data was reported as historical costs. Skogsvik also developed his bankruptcy 
prediction model based on this.  
This study was based on Swedish companies, and the data material included a set of 328 
non-bankrupt firms and 51 firms in financial stress. The financial ratios that were included in 
this model were based on seven categories:  1) Profitability, 2) Costs, 3) Capital turnover, 4) 
Liquidity, 5) Asset structure, 6) Capital structure, 7) Growth. Within these categories, there 
are 79 primary variables that are included in his prediction. These are then tested with a 
component analysis, and non-statistically significant variables are excluded from the model 
(Skogsvik, 1988).  
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3.4 Bernhardsen- logistic bankruptcy prediction 
Bernhardsen developed a bankruptcy prediction model based on the SEBRA database in 
2001, and this is now used by the Norwegian central bank to predict bankruptcies. The 
SEBRA model predicts bankruptcies in the Norwegian market, and this model is based on 
key figures that are derived from accounting figures and information about the companies. 
This model is also derived as a logit model, giving a percentage chance of bankruptcy.  
Bernhardsen used data from the years 1990-1996 in his estimation, and small firms with a 
book value of total assets less than 250.000 NOK were excluded. The sample size was 
398.680 non-bankrupt firms, and 8436 bankrupt firms (Bernhardsen, 2001. p. 14). The key 
ratios included in the analysis are divided in 6 categories. 1) Liquidity, 2) Profitability, 3) 
Solidity, 4) Age, 5) Size, 6) Industry characteristics. Bernhardsen selected the variables 
because some were traditionally used in analysis of credit risk, and some based on trial and 
error (Bernhardsen, 2001. p. 17). His model provided an accuracy of 82-83 %. 
3.5 Comparing previous literature 
The previous literature provides a useful backdrop for us in developing our model. However, 
making a model that can control for fixed effects has seemingly not been done before in 
regards to estimating factors that contribute to bankruptcy. In a way, we are exploring new 
territories and thus we have very little research to compare our results against. The fixed 
effects approach will be compared to other estimation techniques that we find relevant, and 
then we can deduce which of the models will yield the better results. 
We have found that researchers do their estimations using different approaches. Still, 
exploring what explanatory variables and categories they have emphasised is very valuable 
to us. The validity of the research within this field is considered strong and we rely upon it in 
selecting our predictors.  
Altmans discriminant analysis is not directly comparable to the models we are developing, as 
he is using an approach that we are not including. However, the categories that he finds 
significant in terms of companies bankruptcies was relevant to our model. Other than 
Altman, all of the reviewed papers use a binary dependent variable for their estimations.  
This approach is used to such an extent, that in order to compare the performance of our own 
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estimators we have also chosen to estimate our models with a binary dependent variable for 
bankruptcy.  
The most important previous research compared to our model, is the one Bernhardsen did in 
2001. This model is also based on a Norwegian data set, similar to ours. One difference 
between his study and our own is that we include companies off all sizes whereas he 
excluded companies less than a book value of 250.000 NOK. Bernhardsen did a bankruptcy 
prediction using the logistic regression. We are also including a logistic regression model in 
this thesis, as an addition to the other models, as we are interested in how our results 
compare.   
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4. Method 
There are several models for predicting the possible insolvency of a firm. The most 
important ones according to Jackson & Wood (2013) being: (i) multivariate discriminant 
analysis (MDA) models (as proposed by Altman ([1968]), (ii) conditional probability 
models, the most popular being the logit (as used by Ohlson [1980] and Zmijewski [1984]), 
(iii) more recent models based upon artificial intelligent systems such as neural networks, 
genetic algorithms, case-based reasoning and recursive partitioning or (iv) models based on 
pricing theory such as Vassalou and Xing (2004). Jackson & Wood (2013) also assess the 
efficacy of thirteen selected models using post-IFRS UK data and investigate the 
distributional properties of model efficacy. They find that the efficacy of the models is 
generally less than reported in the prior literature. The thirteen different models are of course 
developed with a particular population in mind, which could explain these results.  
Avenhuis (2013) tests the generalizability of some of the most used bankruptcy prediction 
models, specifically Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and Zmijewski (1984). In conclusion, he 
(Avenhuis) finds that “practitioners should use the bankruptcy prediction models with 
caution”. This due to the fact that (1) the frequency of Type I errors is high (Ohlson [1980] 
and Zmijewski [1984]) or (2) the accuracy rate is low (Altman [1986]). To use these models 
in practice, he recommends to “re-estimate the coefficients of the bankruptcy prediction 
models with a specific and bigger sample to improve the predictive power”, which is our 
intention with this paper. That is, we would like to identify some key variables that can 
explain the variation in Norwegian data. We also seek to make use of the panel-data 
structure of our dataset to identify something we think is equally important to the 
performance of these models, namely the effects of manegerial knowledge and financial 
management abilities we find specified in a paper by Thornhill & Amit (2003). They 
underline that newness and smallness are not the only reasons for a company’s default. We 
will differ from the latter mentioned article in the way that we will not have the controls 
specified as variables (they use survey data to attain information on the knowledge of the 
firm) but rather control for firm-specific fixed effects to retrieve more unbiased predicted 
probabilities.  
Considering that each firm has their own unique perception about when they default on their 
payments, simplified  as 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 ± 𝑡, we have that each firm is classified as 
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bankrupt on the date of declaration of bankruptcy ± t depending on if the firm is considered 
risk averse or risk seeking. If risk averse à -t or if risk seeking à +t. If companies tend 
enough towards risk aversion they might declare bankruptcy at a point where others would 
go on and possibly survive. Now, we cannot say that for example boat constructors are 
particularly risk averse people without any qualitative knowledge about the industry. 
However, to rule out the uncertainty of when a firm really is bankrupt we still need to control 
for this when running analyses. Simply running regressions on the mean of this perception 
would bias the results, while controlling for firm-specific fixed effects intuitively would 
improve the estimation. 
In order to describe the variation in our dataset in the best way possible, we use four 
different approaches to accommodate our panel data: Ordinary least squares, random effects, 
the fixed effects approach and lastly the logit estimator. In this chapter we will introduce 
each model before we later apply them to the data.  
4.1 Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
As mentioned, our dataset contains cross-sectional units i at the time interval t. As such, the 
data has a panel format. In the case that we want to estimate a response 𝑦!" for any 
explanatory variables 𝑥!"!, 𝑥!"!, . . , 𝑥!!" we need to be aware that we are estimating 
unobserved factors (error terms) of two types: A component that does not change over time 𝑎!, and a component that does change over time, 𝑢!" . 𝑎! is the unobserved effect, (also called 
unobserved hetoregeneity or fixed effect) and varies by each panel unit, i.e. by firm but not 
by time. This could be capturing characteristics of the firm like ability to run a business. The 𝑢!" is the idiosyncratic error term and while being specific to unit i this will vary over time, 
thus affecting the outcome 𝑦!" . Wooldridge (2014) exemplifies this in a regression model:  𝑦!" = 𝛽!! + 𝛿!𝑑2! + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝑣!" , 𝑡 = 1,2, . . ,𝑇 
Here one possibility is to use pooled OLS, thus ignoring the panel structure of our data. The 
composite error term is then: vit = ai + uit. Because of ai, the error terms vit will be correlated. 
This is a serial correlation within panels, also called cluster correlation (each unit is a 
cluster), which causes bias in our OLS. This can easily be solved by clustering the standard 
errors. If OLS is to be consistent, we also require that xit and the composite error vit are 
uncorrelated.  
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Because vit = ai + uit we need  𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑥!" ,𝑎! = 0 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑥!" ,𝑢!" = 0 
The first of these is violated if xit is determined based on systematic differences in units. 
When Cov(xit, ait) is not equal to zero it is often said that pooled OLS suffers from 
heterogeneity bias (omitted variable bias) due to not incorporating the fixed effects. 
Endogeneity, i.e. Cov(xit, uit) different from zero, occurs when there is a correlation between 
an independent variable 𝑥! and the error term u in a regression (Wooldridge, 2014). If the 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term, the OLS estimation is biased. A 
consequence of not eliminating endogeneity is that the model could lead to spurious results.  
 Next, we comment on the logistic regression, before we describe different ways of 
correcting for the omitted variable bias. 
4.2 Logistic regression (logit) 
The logistic regression is a technique that is often used when the explanatory variable of a 
model is binary. The binary dependent variable takes on two values, e.g. 0 or 1.  
𝑦 =   1  𝑖𝑓  𝑦𝑒𝑠0  𝑖𝑓  𝑛𝑜  
This will model the probability of the outcome being 1. The probability estimation of this 
model will be between 0 and 1.  𝑃 𝑦 = 1 𝑥 =   𝑃(𝑦 = 1 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… , 𝑥!) 
(Wooldridge, 2014). 
The probit model is a similar form of model, which also produces very similar results to the 
logit model. The difference between the logit and the probit model is the assumptions we 
make on the standard errors. In the logit model, the cumulative distribution function is of the 
standard logistic distribution. For the probit model, we assume the standard normal 
cumulative distribution (Wooldridge, 2014). In this thesis we are not reporting probit results 
and the theory described will hence be related to the logit model. 
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The logit model parameters are estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The logit 
model will solve a function to maximize the probability of the observed y-values (0 and 1) 
(Tufte, 2000). This maximizing problem is developed to find the coefficients that give the 
highest probability of a correctly estimated dependent variable.  
The logit-model is a non-linear model. The relationship of a dichotomous outcome variable 
plotted against a continuous independent variable will show the shape of the function in a 
logit model. The S-shaped curve is portraying this relationship.  
Figure 4: The S-shaped curve 
  (Tufte, 2000)  
The probabilities in a logit model will never be below 0 or above 1 (Tufte, 2000), as they 
will in a linear probability model. In order to transform the logistic regression so that it is 
able to take on all values, we have to convert the variables into odd ratios and the log of odd 
ratios. The odd ratios will remove the upper limit of one, and the log of the odd ratios will 
remove the lower limit of 0 (Tufte, 2000). 
Tufte (2000), explains the odds ratio in a logistic model in the formula: 
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠 = 𝑝(1− 𝑝) 
The odds ratio measure how large the probability of y=1 is relative to the probability of y=0. 
It measures the relative risk of the logit model. The logistic regression coefficient output is 
the natural logarithm of the odds ratio (Peng, Lee & Ingersoll, 2002).  
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The log of the odds ratios is called the logit, and is expressed by the following formula 
(Tufte, 2000) 
𝐿 = ln   𝑝1− 𝑝  
The interpretation of the logit model is that an increase in the x variable will make the 
probability of y more or less likely. We are able to interpret the sign of the coefficient, 
telling us whether the probability will increase or decrease, but we cannot directly interpret 
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. To correct for any fixed effects we need to 
introduce different estimators, starting with random effects. 
4.3 Random effects (RE) 
We start with the equation written for a unit i: 𝑦!" = 𝛿! + 𝑥!!𝛽 + 𝑎! + 𝑢!" , 𝑡 = 1,2, . . ,𝑇 
Where  𝑥!"𝛽 =   𝛽!𝑥!"! + 𝛽!𝑥!"!+. .+𝛽!𝑥!"#. The 𝛿! here represents different time intercepts. 
Random effects assumes that the unobserved effect is random. In other words; that the 
composite term vit = ai + uit is uncorrelated with x, thus that ai is uncorrelated with x. The 
other side to this is that RE is consistent only under this assumption. If this assumption 
holds, RE is the most efficient way of correcting for the omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 
2014). We will later show that a fixed effects transformation (FE) removes the ai from the 
estimating equation in order to get consistent estimates of 𝛽 in spite of correlation between ai 
and x,. 
RE can include time-constant observed controls (these are differenced or time-demeaned 
away with FE). With good time-constant controls, RE may be convincing as more is taken 
out of ai as we add time-constant variables (Wooldridge, 2014). The RE estimators also 
assume no serial correlation and no heteroscedasticity in the error term uit.  
Heteroscedasticity arises when the error term u has a not consistent variance given any value 
of the explanatory variable: 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑢 𝑥 ≠   𝜎!. Heteroskedasticity does not cause bias or 
inconsistency in the estimation. However, it will cause the standard errors to be invalid for 
constructing confidence intervals and t-statistics (Wooldridge 2014, p. 213).  
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If the assumptions about serial correlation and heteroscedasticity fail we use cluster-robust 
inference as for the other models. 
The RE estimator is a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) procedure. It uses the fact 
that under the RE assumption the composite error term is serially correlated in a particular 
way, giving rise to the following correlation between errors in period t and s (Wooldridge, 
2014 p.396): 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑣!" , 𝑣!" = 𝜎!!𝜎!! + 𝜎!! = 𝜌 
The RE transformation similarly removes the serial correlation in the composite error terms; 
𝜃 = 1− 11+ 𝑇(𝜎!!/𝜎!! !/! 
Where 𝜎!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜎! can be found from FE-estimates (see chapter 4.3). 
As such, the RE estimates can be obtained from the pooled OLS regression: 
𝑦!" − 𝜃𝑦!   𝑜𝑛  𝑥!" − 𝜃𝑥! , 𝑡 = 1, . . ,𝑇; 𝑖 = 1, . . ,𝑁. 
Where 𝑦!" − 𝜃𝑦!   is called a «partially-time-demeaned» variable. Because 𝜃 lies between zero 
and one, only a fraction of the mean is in fact removed (Wooldridge, 2014); 
𝜃 ≈ 0   ↔   𝛽!" ≈ 𝛽!"#$ 𝜃 ≈ 1   ↔   𝛽!" ≈ 𝛽!" 
We note that 𝜃  is close to one when 𝜎!!/𝜎!! is large (the variance of the unobserved part of 
the composite error term is “dominating”) or when T is large. With large T, there should be 
small or no difference between the FE- and the RE-estimator.1  
 
 
                                                
1 Stata does this transformation in a similar way to the fixed effects transformation, but with a different subscript. 
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4.4 Fixed effects estimator (FE) 
The fixed effects estimator, also called “within-transformation” removes the within i time 
averages. Another name for it is “time-demeaning” of the variable, which is fitting, seeing 
how the transformation demeans away any observation in our regression that is constant 
(Wooldridge, 2014 p.387) 𝑦!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝑎! + 𝑢!" 
We average this equation across t for each unit i to get 𝑦! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝑎! + 𝑢!" 
Which we then subtract from other time periods: 𝑦!" − 𝑦! = 𝛽! 𝑥!" − 𝑥! + 𝑢!" − 𝑢!  
Where 𝑦! = 𝑇!! 𝑦!"  !!!!  is a “time average” for unit i. 
We then use OLS on the deviations from time averages to estimate  𝛽!, the FE estimator.2 
The uit might have serial correlation (and heteroscedasticity), and so we use cluster robust 
inference as with the RE estimator. The FE estimator requires strict exogeneity, i.e. that the 
xit are uncorrelated with uis for all s (Wooldridge, 2014).  
Computing pooled OLS and FE estimators can be informative and we will use both in 
applications. If OLS is different from FE, it indicates explanatory variables correlated with 
ai.  
 
 
 
                                                
2 We do not do the within transformation manually: Stata does this for us with the xtreg command. 
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4.5 Discussion of the estimators 
In this introduction of our models, we have described four estimators that we will apply to 
our dataset. Firstly, we explain the pooled OLS estimator (OLS), which we do on the levels. 
Next, we comment on the logit as a possible solution to the linear probability constraint. 
Then, we elaborate on the random effects estimator (RE) which essentially is OLS on the 
partially time-demeaned variables. Lastly, we elaborate on the fixed effects estimator (FE), 
which is a OLS run on the time-demeaned variables.  
OLS on the levels is usually deficient, unless we include things like lagged y which is not 
allowed in the other methods. With good controls and lags of y in OLS, we might be able to 
make a convincing analysis. On the other hand, if we believe an unobserved fixed effect is 
important, we do prefer the other estimators.  
Due to the above-mentioned fact that FE does not consider time-constant variables RE is 
always more efficient than FE provided that the RE assumption 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑥!" ,𝑎! = 0  holds. 
Given this, RE and FE will be similar if T is large. If RE and FE estimates are very different, 
we want to know if we can use the more efficient RE, or whether we must reject RE in favor 
of FE. 
As is the case for us later on, we can test for RE versus FE using the Hausman-test. The 
basic intuition of this test is that under the main assumption of the RE-estimator 
(𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑥!" ,𝑎! = 0), both RE and FE are consistent estimators. However, if only RE is 
efficient the null hypothesis in the Hausman-test is that the above assumption actually holds, 
i.e. that there is no systematic within i variation. As a consequence, if the p-value of this test 
is small, we reject the null and prefer the FE over the RE-estimator. 
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5. Data material 
5.1 Sample selection 
This thesis is an empirical study based on a dataset of Norwegian accounting figures. The 
data material was originally separated by years and divided in to two categories, based on 
accounting data and general information about each company. We decided to merge the 
years and the two categories so that we are able to perform our analysis on the entire range 
of companies in Norway. As a result, we were left with panel-data, each panel having 
information for both the separate sets, distributed across as yearly observations. This way we 
are able to gather a large amount of information for each firm. Before we were able to start 
with our analysis, we had to clean the dataset so that the remaining data were relevant for our 
model. 
The dataset includes data spanning from 1992-2012. However, in 1998 changes were made 
in the Norwegian legislation. The accounting act of 1998 presented new tax regulations for 
group contributions between companies within the same group. It also changed the 
requirements for which companies that had to submit consolidating accounts (Berner, Mjøs 
& Olving, 2014 p.1). This radically changed the company structure for many businesses in 
Norway, making it difficult to compile data across panels before this point.  
Further, IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) rules were implemented from 
2005 and onwards, making all listed companies in Norway required to report after this 
standard. Reporting for the period between 1998 and 2005 therefore differs from the ones 
after in regards to listed companies, enough to make us focus on the period 2005-2012.  
In our dataset, we have a variable that takes on the value of the year a company goes 
bankrupt. Specifically it lists the year the liquidation proceedings starts (Berner, Mjøs & 
Olving p. 26). In transforming this to a binary variable we first had to change the year 
format, starting by taking into consideration that every panel contained this information. As 
such, we had to make a rule that only allowed one observation of the actual bankruptcy per 
firm. There were also observations of firms that had filed for bankruptcy more than once.  
There is variation between companies as to whether the bankruptcy date is set one year or 
two years after their last active year of operations. In defining our new variable, we made the 
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bankruptcy occur one year after the last active year of operations for all companies. Since the 
Norwegian legislation states that a bankruptcy proceeding starts when a company is 
insolvent, we found it appropriate to define the variable like this. As a result, we could now 
generate a binary variable across all panels for the bankruptcy observations, such that 𝑦!!!. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Our dataset consists of almost 2 million separate panel observations on the accounting data 
of Norwegian firms in the period 2005-2012. Because of the bankruptcy definition used, we 
end up with some 18194 firms that have gone bankrupt during this period, but distributed on 
the years 2006-2013 as shown below.  
Table 1: Number of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms in the data set 
 
During the merging of accounting and company data we lost 1418 observations, mostly due 
to lack of company information available, as some companies were not listed in this registry. 
It is assumed however, that these companies were too small to have had any implication on 
the analysis since they either have not started up properly, or refrained from financial 
activity and none of them ever declared bankruptcy.  
Whilst describing the data, we sensed that younger firms seemed more susceptible to 
financial distress. There are also many authoritative articles describing this “liability of 
adolescence” (Freeman et al. 1983), (Carroll, 1983) and (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). Carroll 
(1983) describes exit rates that decline monotonically to a positive asymptote, which we can 
see from appendix A.1 is the case for our distributions as well. As we take a closer look on 
bankruptcies distributed by age, we observe that almost 30% of the bankrupt firms in our 
study go out of business during their first year, declining in a positive asymptote.  
Year% Non)Bankrupt% Bankrupt% Total% Bankruptcy%rate%%2006% 169,087% 1,637% 170,724% 0,96% %2007% 199,666% 1,501% 201,167% 0,75% %2008% 218,315% 3,196% 221,511% 1,44% %2009% 230,938% 2,662% 233,600% 1,14% %2010% 234,861% 2,545% 237,406% 1,07% %2011% 238,247% 2,148% 240,395% 0,89% %2012% 246,317% 2,342% 248,659% 0,94% %2013% 261,086% 2,163% 263,249% 0,82% %%
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Further, a regression on age categories (Table 2) also confirms this distribution and the way 
it affects the risk of a company going bankrupt. For a firm between 5 and 9 years there is a 
negative and significant effect on going bankrupt (in regards to the 0-4 category). This effect 
increases in magnitude as a company ages, and it seems being an older firm means you are 
less likely to fail.  
Table 2: Regression on age categories 
 (1) 
 Bankrupt 
Age 5-9 years -0.00633*** 
 (0.000198) 
  
Age 10-25 years -0.00942*** 
 (0.000176) 
  
Age 26+ years -0.0118*** 
 (0.000296) 
  
Constant 0.0154*** 
 (0.000120) 
R2 0.002 
Observations 1816540 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
However, as previously discussed newness and smallness are not the only reasons for 
bankruptcy.  Even older firms can default on their obligations given a pattern that exists prior 
to the bankruptcy itself, which is what we seek to identify.  
The bankruptcies in our dataset does follow this even distribution, except for the years 2008-
2010 during which the financial crisis and its repercussions created a spike in firms that 
could not fulfill their financial obligations. We can discover this by looking at the more 
uneven histogram in appendix A.2 and comparing it to the one in A.1. We spot that older 
firms are more exposed during the financial crisis, which implies that some firms are more 
likely to fail regardless of age given enough exposure. However, well over 20 % of the firms 
are still in their first year of business. As we later analyse the data, these patterns should add 
to our explanation albeit with the risk of overstating the effects. The simple fact remains that 
there exits characteristics within firms that can make them more exposed to a default, and 
these factors should thus be evaluated.   
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Amongst the other points of interest as to what can explain why a company cannot fulfill 
their financial obligations is the particular industry it operates in and whether this has some 
special characteristic that makes businesses within it different or more risk seeking. 
Appendix A.3 shows a spread of bankruptcies by industry, where we can clearly see that 
some industries are more exposed.  
Interestingly, category 30 is the category for office machinery and computers, while 55 is the 
category for hotels and restaurants. Office machinery and computers has the largest 
percentage of bankruptcies by far, which initially sounds strange, as there were other 
categories we expected had a higher rates, such as the production of boats. However, 
especially the wholesale and manufacture of computers can be very resource intensive, so it 
is possible to imagine. In either case, there could be an added risk that is industry dependent, 
unless there is culture within the industry for sloppy accounting/management. In any event, 
this gives raise to the intuition that industry specific effects should be taken into account 
during the analysis.  
Appendix A.4 is a bar chart to illustrate the difference between big and small firms. This 
difference seems to be consistent, i.e. larger firms are less likely to go bankrupt. This might 
be due to larger savings, better bank relations or continuous demand for their product, the 
fact remains that size should matter.  
All of the above certainly suggests that newness and smallness does have large impact. 
Keeping this in mind, we seek to identify the remaining controls for what determines a 
bankruptcy.  
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5.3 Choosing variables and key figures 
When deciding which variables to use as input in our model, we base our choices on 
extensive analysis of previous research, combined with own ideas. The variables are key 
figures and financial ratios that we have developed from the data material. We are presenting 
most of our variables as ratios that are comparable across companies. Starting by choosing 
key variables from a variety of literature, mainly Skogsvik (1988), Altman (1968) and 
Ohlson (1980), many financial measures were first identified. These were then reduced to 15 
by identifying those relevant to the economic framework a Norwegian firm must relate to. 
We also chose 5 firm-specific characteristics that all have been described as determining 
factors, size, age and industry being the most noteworthy. 
To ensure that we include variables from different categories of accounting and company 
data, we are using Bernhardsen’s main categories from his research paper (2001) as a 
framework. The categories also follow a similar classification in the previous research that 
we have described.  
 
In addition to this, we include a category related to growth similar to Skogsvik (1988). This 
way we are able to examine if expanding a business leads to a higher or lower risk of 
bankruptcy. Both Skogsvik (1988) and Bernhardsen (2001) find that growth ratios 
significantly predicts corporate failure. 
 Table 3 presents an overview of the categories and the key figures that are included in each 
of them, then we make an in depth review of each variable.   
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Table 3: Overview of key-ratios and dummy variables 
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5.3.1 Liquidity 
A company is insolvent if they are not able to meet their obligations in time. Having enough 
liquidity is therefore important to avoid insolvency and possibly bankruptcy. Liquidity ratios 
measure how much cash and liquid assets a company holds. The need for liquidity in a 
business will depend on the business type, however we find liquidity ratios relevant to 
include in our model. Appendix A.5 contains the means of the liquidity measures. These 
show that bankrupt firms have consistently lower ratios of liquidity as defined in Liquidity 
ratio 2 and 3. Surprisingly, bankrupt firms have higher ratios of L1. 
Liquidity ratio 1  𝑳𝟏 = 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉 + 𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔  𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔  
Liquidity ratio 1 is a measure of how large share of the companies’ assets is liquid. This is an 
important ratio to get an indication of how liquid the business is. If this ratio proves to be 
significant in the model, this is a ratio the companies can change themselves. A company 
with a small percentage of their assets as liquid may consider changing the structure of their 
assets if they are at risk of failure. 
Liquidity ratio 2  𝑳𝟐 =   𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉 + 𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝑺𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒕 − 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎  𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕  
Meeting short-term liabilities is crucial for a company. Liquidity 2 gives information on the 
ratio between liquid assets and debt that is due within one year. A low L2 may be an 
indicator that the company struggles to meet their liabilities. 
Liquidity ratio 3 (Altman, 1968)(Ohlson, 1980) 
 
𝑳𝟑 = 𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈  𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔  
The working capital is defined as current assets - current liabilities. Liquidity ratio 3 is also a 
measure of how liquid a business is, and it is incorporated the current liabilities. These 
liabilities will impact the companies’ financial state, and the capacity to meet short-term 
debt. 
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5.3.2 Profitability 
In the long run, a company has to be profitable to be an attractive business. A profitable 
business will attract more investors. Having investors interested in the company could lead 
to a larger market value if shares are sold, and hence raising more capital. More capital can 
be used to expand the company, or to meet current obligations. If a company is leveraged, 
they need a certain profitability to be able to handle these obligations.  The ratios used in this 
category are commonly known profitability ratios that are often used to measure the 
performance and to compare companies. A.6 contains a spread of the Means of the 
profitability measures. Bankrupt firms have higher values of P1, which we later discuss in 
chapter 6. Otherwise, non-bankrupt firms have higher profitability margins.  
Profit margin 1 (Altman,1968) 𝑷𝟏 = 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔  𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔  
Profit margin 1 is a standard measure for total asset turnover that varies greatly from 
industry to industry.  
Profit margin 2 (Altman, 1968) 
 
𝑷𝟐 = 𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻  𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 
Profit margin 2 measures the profitability of the company compared to the amount of assets 
they own. EBIT is earnings before interest and tax and equals operating result + other 
income. This ratio is similar to one used in Skogsvik from 1988, except he only included the 
operating results/total asset.  This ratio includes “other income“ and is somewhat more 
informative  as it encapsulates more about the total profitability of the company. 
Return on equity (ROE) 𝑹𝑶𝑬 = 𝑵𝒆𝒕  𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚  
This ratio indicates how much income the company generates compared to how much equity 
the shareholders have in the company. A high ROE means that the company is profitable in 
terms of creating value from the amount of equity available. This ratio does not give 
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information on how much debt the company has. This may impact the net income, as debt 
gives possibilities for larger investments. We have included this feature in the next variable, 
ROA. 
Return on assets (ROA) 𝑹𝑶𝑨 = 𝑵𝒆𝒕  𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 
ROA is a standard measure of how much earnings the company is able to get compared to 
how much assets they hold. Compared to the profit margin variable, the net income also 
includes interest expenses/income and taxes. This ratio was also used in Ohlson’s model 
from 1980, but with a different variable name. This variable measures the profitability over 
both equity and debt capital. 
Net loss dummy (Y) 𝒀 = 𝟏  𝒊𝒇  𝒏𝒆𝒕  𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔  𝒇𝒐𝒓  𝒕𝒘𝒐  𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔𝟎  𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆  
A dummy to indicate if a firm runs deficits for two consecutive years.  
5.3.3 Solidity 
The intention of this category is to include a measure of how solid the companies are. The 
solidity of a business is an indication of how well they are able to handle changes in external 
circumstances in e.g. cyclical downturns in the economy. We are including variables that 
describe the leverage situation in the companies in this category. A change in e.g. interest 
rates will have a higher impact on companies that are more financed with debt. A.8 in the 
appendix describes the mean of these solidity measures, bankrupt firms being consistently 
less solid and perform worse in terms of leverage. 
Solidity ratio 1 (Skogsvik, 1988) 𝑺𝟏 = 𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 
Solidity ratio 1 is a variable that gives us information on how much of the total capital in the 
business is owned by the shareholders. The leveraged part of the capital may impose a risk if 
the macro economical situation change. 
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Solidity 2  𝑺𝟐 = 𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒈𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒅  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆  𝒇𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 
A ratio that describes how much of a firm’s assets that are considered as collateral by the 
creditors.  
Debt ratio 1  𝑫𝟏 = 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 
Debt ratio 1 is the counterpart of Solidity 1. Total assets are a combination of equity and 
debt. The debt ratio is relevant in a bankruptcy prediction model, as the debt imposes a risk 
on the business. The debt is also a capital gain that the company could use to pay off their 
liability.  
Debt ratio 2  𝑫𝟐 = 𝑵𝒆𝒕  𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕  
Debt ratio 2 provides information on how much income the business generates compared to 
the amount of debt they have.  
Solidity dummy (X) 𝑿 = 𝟏  𝒊𝒇  𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕 > 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝟎  𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆  
Typically zero, this dummy indicates whether or not a company is “solid”. A value of 1 
means the company is technically bankrupt and should in theory default on their obligations. 
5.3.4 Age 
We find that there is a relationship between the age of the company and when it goes 
bankrupt. It seems like younger companies more often fail than older companies. Due to this 
we want to include a variable in the model that can capture this.  
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Dummy variable of the age of a company 
Based on our variable in the dataset of the companies starting year, we have developed age 
intervals as dummy variables. We have divided the age into four intervals in a similar 
manner to Olsen & Øien (2009): 
• 0-­‐4	  years	  
• 5-­‐9	  years	  
• 10-­‐25	  years	  
• 26	  à	  years	  
5.3.5 Size 
Our hypothesis is that the size of the company may have an impact on the probability of 
going bankrupt. To investigate this, we are including a size variable in our model.  
Dummy variable of the size of a company 
The European commission is basing their definition of small companies on three factors: 1) 
Number of employees in the company, 2) Turnover, 3) Balance sheet total (European 
commission, 2003). 
Since the EU area is very different in size compared to the Norwegian market, we have 
decided to use lower rates on each of the factors than the EU. We have defined our variable 
“small” as a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if: 
1. The company have ≤  50 employees and turnover is ≤ than 70.000.000 NOK per year 
and/or 
2. Balance sheet total ≤ 35.000.000 NOK 
 
5.3.6 Industry characteristics 
The industry a company operates in is affecting many aspects of the business.  Industries are 
related to the market, and political and economical changes may affect them differently. 
Regulations and competition that are directly connected to specific industries will also affect 
companies in the given industry. Our descriptive statistics gives us an indication of which 
industry that is most prone to bankruptcy. A variable that includes which industry a company 
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is operating in is therefore included in our model. 
Dummy variable of industry 
Our dataset contains a numeric variable for SIC2002 industry codes (A.3) where the 
numbers represent different industries. We developed dummy variables for each of the 
industries and included them in our model. This way we are able to see if being in a certain 
industry affects the probability of going bankrupt. 
5.3.7 Growth 
A business in a growing state is often vulnerable due to large investments and unsecure 
future results. Businesses in their early state are often exposed to these risks of expanding. A 
category of variables that capture this is therefore included in our model to explore if the 
growth leads to a higher or lower probability of failure. A.9 in the appendix describes mean 
ratios for bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. The former growing less all over, except for the 
measure on growth in revenue, where bankrupt firms show a spike in growth for later years.  
Growth revenue (Skogsvik, 1988) 𝑮𝟏 = ∆𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆  𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔  𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 
 
Growth assets (Skogsvik, 1988) 𝑮𝟐 = ∆𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔  𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔  𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 
 
Growth equity (Skogsvik, 1988) 𝑮𝟑 = ∆𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚  𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔  𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 
 
Growth current liabilities (Skogsvik, 1988) 𝑮𝟒 = ∆𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕  𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕  𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔  𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔  𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of key ratios 
 
 mean p50 p10 p90 min max 
Liquidity ratio 1 .9451953 .9952105 .0577957 1.929078 -3117 1444 
Liquidity ratio 2 43.68965 2.309154 .4078883 25.54545 -383260.7 1467595 
Liquidity ratio 3 -.9228768 .436553 -.1505945 1.528292 -202398 19945 
Profit margin 1 1.528903 .1619335 0 3.452365 -841 19585 
Profit margin 2 -.3507728 .0290608 -.2393423 .3850686 -19282 19497.4 
Return on equity .4186543 .126995 -.3609467 1.141949 -59266 33751.25 
Return on assets -.3700188 .0239502 -.2203978 .3112033 -19282 19497.4 
Solidity ratio 1 -2.431669 .3286214 -.1219008 .9703704 -202397 19946 
Solidity ratio 2 .0000395 0 0 0 0 18.5 
Debt ratio 1 3.431526 .6713062 .0295567 1.121844 -19945 202398 
Debt ratio 2 2.657801 .0445691 -.3574661 1.014 -736359 1424964 
Growth revenue 1.936119 .0292398 -.516129 .7811745 -14475.71 129291 
Growth assets 3.721158 .0075361 -.3181818 .6717325 -10372.83 194136 
Growth equity 1.633112 .0309278 -.6801872 1.063588 -138484 188140 
Growth c.liabilities 12.29643 .0179196 -.69967 1.684685 -70047.5 1299999 
2-year deficit .1827458 0 0 1 0 1 
Debt > Total assets .1441042 0 0 1 0 1 
Observations 1816540      
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6. Results 
This part of or thesis is assigned to present our results, and our analysis of the results.   
The very first step was to test all the primary variables that we selected. Eliminating a 
number of the primary variables was necessary because we wanted the model to be 
manageable, with not to many variables. It was also important to have variables that did not 
correlate strongly with each other. If we were to have multicollinearity present the overall 
estimation would be correct, but the partial effects are difficult to estimate (Wooldridge, 
2014, p. 262). Since we wish to estimate the impact of these partial effects on the probability 
of failure, and in particular if the estimations differ across the different approaches, we had 
to address this issue. The process of downsizing the number of independent financial 
measures has made the model more solid in respect to this and trial and error testing of the 
primary variables enabled us to identify ratios and key figures that determine a bankruptcy.  
Estimations of the OLS, logit, RE and FE models are reported. Effects of the control 
variables are listed in the appendix. For consistency, effects are reported and discussed in 
percentage points. 
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6.1 OLS 
The OLS results are shown in appendix A.10. First, we include the right hand variables 
stepwise to see if there are any relationships we should be aware of as we expand the model 
from:  1   𝑦!!!! =𝛽! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛1!" + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜1!" + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜1!" + 𝛽! ∗𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜2!" + 𝑎! + 𝜇!"         ⋮  5 𝑦!"!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛1!" + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜1!" + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜1!"+ 𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜2!" + 𝛽! ∗ 2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 !"+ 𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 5~9 !" + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 10~25 !" + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 26~ !" + 𝛽!"∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠!" + 𝛽!" ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦!"+ 𝛽!" ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠!" + 𝑎! + 𝜇!"   
Secondly, we control for year effects in column (6-8), industry effects (7-8) and 
year×industry in (8) which is is exemplified as: 
 𝑦!"!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥!,!" +⋯+ 𝛽! + 𝑥!,!" + 𝑒!𝐸! +⋯+ 𝑒!𝐸! + 𝛿!𝑇! +⋯+ 𝛿!𝑇! + 𝑎! + 𝜇!",  
where 𝑦!"!! is the dependent variable for bankruptcy (set one year after the last registered 
year of operations). We have that I = entity and t = time. 𝑥!,!" represents the independent 
variables that are named in regression (5), 𝛽! is the coefficients for the independent 
variables, 𝑎! + 𝜇!" is the error term, E is the entity n. Since the industry variables are binary 
we have n-1 entities included in the model. 𝑒! is the coefficient of the binary regressors 
(entities). 𝑇! is the binary variable for time, such that we have t-1 time periods. 𝛿! is the 
coefficient for the binary time regressors. The intercept in the first (base) period is 𝛽! and 
that for the next period is 𝛽! + 𝛿!.  
The year dummies allows the intercept to change over time accounting for any general shifts 
(i.e. trends) in our data. The industry dummy captures this effect for industries while the 
interaction term allows the slopes to change over time.  
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In appendix A.10 we report the results of linear regressions on our bankruptcy variable. As 
well as being used for forecasting, the simple linear regression model is valuable in 
evaluating the historical effects of the predictors. To do this we use normal statistical 
inference methods. We clarify if there is any identifiable effect of x on y, i.e. if there is 
enough evidence to suggest a relationship to, in our case, the probability of going bankrupt. 
The test is a simple test of the slope parameters, for us this is equivalent to saying:  H!:  β!" = 0 
Then preferring the alternative H!:  β!" ≠ 0  wherever the coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. For lower p-values the observed data are extremely unlikely to have 
come to be if the null hypothesis is true and so we choose our initial variables based on the 
existence of a likely relationship.  A requirement of doing this “pooling” on data is to fix the 
serial correlation of 𝑣!!𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑣!! etc, in the composite error term: 𝑣!" = 𝑎! + 𝑢!" (Torres-
Reyna, 2007). This problem is solved by using robust standard errors from column (2) and 
onwards. 
Initially, in column (1) we identify the significant effects of Profit margin 1, Liquidity ratio 
1, Solidity ratio 1 and Solidity ratio 2. The values of the coefficients are altered once we 
control for a 2-year deficit in column two (2). The profitability and liquidity ratios both do 
not change significantly in columns (3) through (7) which shows that the figures are 
independent from each other. However, when we include the industry effects the profit 
margin decreases in magnitude and the sign on liquidity ratio now has an impact of -0.00134 
percentage points. A change like this upon including the industry effects suggests that there 
are industry specific effects and that these are also creating biased results, underlining the 
intuition that we should control for them. Intuitively, increasing either the profit margin or 
the liquidity of a firm should not increase the probability of going bankrupt. As to why Profit 
margin 1 never changes sign it might make sense to increase sales, but probably not to scale 
down business while trying to avoid bankruptcy. After all, the ratio is sales/total assets and 
scaling down the assets alongside the sales of a firm is captured in this ratio. And with fewer 
assets a firm will also be more exposed to failure. 
Solidity ratio 1 has a low effect, and is never significant throughout this analysis.  This ratio 
is an important measure of the firm’s equity, and we are reluctant to drop it from the model. 
We are keeping it to see if the same results are also the case for any of the other estimators. 
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Solidity ratio 2 has an effect of -0.00165 percentage points (2) increasing in magnitude for 
each step ending up at a -0.00205 percentage point change in the bankruptcy probability for 
a unit change in the ratio.  
Column (2) adds the dummy 2-year deficit. At the beginning of the variable inclusion, we 
were also working with another dummy variable controlling for cases where debt was larger 
than total assets. At first glance these dummies, 2-year deficit and Debt > Total assets, were 
somewhat correlated, but the model was able to separate each effect without the remainder 
of the model changing. However, controlling for a technical bankruptcy when predicting 
bankruptcies seemed superfluous, so Debt > Total assets was dropped from further analysis 
also removing any bias from including both dummies. Both variables suggested evidence 
that their coefficients are significantly different from zero and we conclude that the null is 
not preferable in their case, thus we kept the dummy that controlled for successive deficits 
for later analysis, and that result is included in column (2) and onwards. Its impact on the 
probability of going bankrupt is 0.0218 percentage points for a change in the dummy for two 
consecutive years of running a deficit. This value increases somewhat when adding our 
growth figures (5) before it decreases again when controlling for year effects (6), industry 
effects (7) and year specific industry shocks (8) ending up at around 0.0227 percentage 
points. This variable thus has a very large impact on the probability and a positive as such. 
I.e. for any given firm that runs two consecutive deficits the probability of bankruptcy goes 
up by a whole lot. Comparing it to the mean of going bankrupt in our dataset, 0.01, any such 
firm would have its probability of default more than tripled.  
Further, in column (3) we include our measure of size, Size (1 if small). This is at first of 
some impact to the probability of failure, about a 0.0065 percentage point increase for being 
small company. It makes sense that being a smaller firm actually would increase your 
probability of going bankrupt. This effect interestingly becomes smaller when we include 
growth, then it becomes larger again as we include the dummies for the years, staying 
significantly different from zero throughout and in (8) has a value of 0.0045 percentage 
points. Smaller firms are clearly subject to a higher probability of bankruptcy. Should 
anything occur, they have less of a safety net to cover their losses.  
The addition of the age categories in column (4) provides the insight that younger firms are 
more likely to go bankrupt. The values of the age categories in our table is referenced to the 
omitted category of the youngest firms (0-4 years), thus the probability of going bankrupt is 
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increasingly negative the older a firm gets, in thread with our initial testing and the initial 
idea of younger firms being more exposed. Probably they have less experience and 
competence to draw upon in times of financial pressure.  
In column (5) we add the growth measures. We decided to incorporate these in our model in 
order to capture the effects of expanding a company on bankruptcy probability. Surprisingly, 
these variables turned out to be not significant. Counter-intuitive, as one would expect that 
these variables were to have some effect on the probability of a default. In addition the 
literature describes these measures as being important predictors for bankruptcy. However, 
none of the growth variables show any sign of significance.  
From the year dummies we observe that simply being a firm in 2008 or 2009 clearly exposed 
firms to more risk as all the other years has negative impacts compared to these two years, 
2009 being somewhat “worse” than 2008.  
Industries that we can say with confidence impact the probability of going bankrupt reported 
by industry code (SIC):  
Increasing probability Reducing probability 
2 Forestry and logging 18 Wearing apparel., fur 
15 Food products and beverages 75 Public administration and defence 
20 Wood and wood products 91 Membership organizations n.e.c. 
28 Fabricated metal products  
32 Radio, TV sets, communication equip.  
45 Construction  
52 Retail trade, repair personal goods  
 
We note that most of the industries that have a reduced probability of going bankrupt are 
also ones that receive protection or subsidies in some way. 
Looking at the interaction term, we identify some year specific industry shocks that 
increased probability for bankruptcy. In 2007, as a consequence of the global recession the 
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industries: 50 Motor vehicle services 55 Hotels and restaurants and 67 Auxiliary financial 
intermediation experience a higher probability of going bankrupt. The industry 55 Hotels 
and restaurants receives another shock like this in 2011.  
Conversely, some industries also experienced positive shocks, i.e. a decrease in probability 
of going bankrupt: 45 Construction and 62 Air transport experience such shocks in 2008. In 
2009 14 Other mining and quarrying and 45 Construction have lower probabilities of going 
bankrupt, while in 2012 2 Forestry and logging, 36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. and 45 
Construction receive these shocks. To some extent, this confirms the validity of our data as 
we are able to identify the impact of the financial crisis, and what we believe to be results of 
government policy. Just to take some examples, in 2008, the monopoly on air shuttle traffic 
ended in Norway. In 2009, the Norwegian government renewed promises of keeping the coal 
industry on Svalbard alive (Ministry of Justice, 2009, p.1).  In regards to construction, we 
can only make educated guesses but it could be attributed to public funding of large projects 
and/or an ever increasing demand for housing. 
6.2 Logit model 
The logit model is a model that uses a binary dependent variable. The results we get from 
this binary model are interpreted as the percentage likelihood of a business going bankrupt. 
We think that this percentage likelihood of bankruptcy is a good addition to our thesis, as it 
is a model that transforms the data in a different way and thus serves as a robustness check.  
Since this is a binary model, we needed a dummy variable for bankruptcy. The dummy 
variable takes the value 0 if the company never has gone bankrupt, and the value 1 if the 
company has gone bankrupt.  
𝑦!!! = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑒  𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
This binary dummy variable is the same dependent variable we have used in all of the 
models we have estimated.  The OLS dependent variable, often a continuous variable, is in 
our case binary. Therefore we find it interesting to compare this with a logistic model that is 
specifically designed to handle a dichotomous outcome. We cannot directly compare the 
coefficients from the logit model with the other models, but we are interested to se if there 
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are any additions to our analysis we can draw from the logit model (A.13, appendix). We 
have also modelled a logistic regression that gives odd ratios as output, for the intention of 
making the analysis more informative (A.11, appendix). 
When we plot our binary dependent variable against the profitability margin, we find the S-
shaped curve that the logistic regression provides.  
Figure 5: Plot of the S-kurve 
 
The sign of the coefficients in the logit model is what we are interested in analysing. They 
are interpreted together with the odds ratios for the variables. 
The net loss dummy for a 2-year deficit that are describing a net loss in the two previous 
years, get an odds ratio value of 4,7. In addition to this the sign of the coefficient is positive, 
indicating a higher probability of default. The odds ratios tell us that if a company have a 
two year period with a deficit, the probability of bankruptcy is 4, 7 times higher than if they 
do not have a net loss in two consecutive years. 
The size variable is defined as a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the company 
is small, and 0 if the company is large. When we estimate the model with odd ratios as 
output, we find that the odd ratio for size is approximately 2.2. This suggest that companies 
that are defined as small are 2,2 times more likely to go bankrupt than the larger companies. 
The sign of the coefficient in the logit regression is also positive, which indicates a higher 
probability of bankruptcy if the company is small. The size of the company will impact its 
probability of default. 
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For the age dummies that we have included, we se that the sign of the coefficients are 
negative. As they are measured against the reference category of age 0-4 years, this is a sign 
that as the company gets older, the probability of bankruptcy falls. The odd ratios of the age 
variables have a lower value for each age interval the company go up, also proof of a lower 
probability of bankruptcy as the company ages. This is consistent with what we assumed.  
The financial crisis have been up for debate and analysis to a large extent the last years, and 
it have been a understanding that the Norwegian market was less affected by the financial 
crisis compared to other countries. Nevertheless, the signs of the coefficients in the year 
dummies are positive in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, meaning that the probability of 
bankruptcy is higher in this period. This is interesting, because even though the Norwegian 
marked did not get hit as hard as others, it implies that the probability of bankruptcy in 
Norway was affected by the financial crisis. The world is globalized, and the national 
Norwegian marked has been affected by the recession in other parts of the world.  
6.3 Random effects 
In the random effects model we assume that the variation across companies is random, i.e. 
that the difference across the units is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Comparing 
differences between companies, the goal of using the RE approach is to have the most 
efficient estimate. RE is preferred over FE because it can be better assuming there are no 
fixed effects present. We later test for this assumption. When the variables change across 
time and between companies with one unit, the coefficient will show the average effect of 
the variables over the bankruptcy dependent variable. Thus we are able to interpret the time 
invariant variables like the variables for size or age of the company. The independent 
variables will include both within-entity effects and between-entity effects.  
The liquidity ratio in this model gives us an estimation that indicates some signs of trouble. 
As liquidity increases (increased by a unit), the probability of default also goes up. This is a 
result that makes no sense, and contradicts results from the other estimators. The 2-year 
deficit variable has a significant coefficient of 0.0163 percentage points, which is lower than 
in the OLS estimation. The probability of bankruptcy will in this estimation increase with 
this 0.0163 percentage points if the company have a 2-year net loss, so this factor still makes 
sense. 
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The size variable in this model has a coefficient that is significant and positive. Age 
categories are negative measured against the youngest age interval of 0-4 years. This also 
makes sense as the probability of default is reduced as the company becomes older.  
By performing a Breusch and Pagan Lagrange- multiplier test for random effects we find 
that the null hypothesis of var(u)=0 is preffered due to a non-significant test value.  This 
indicated that there are not sufficient random effects in the model. Due to this, OLS with 
good controls, or FE, might be a better approach than RE. 
6.4 Fixed effects 
In the fixed effects model we are analysing the impact of the variables that change over time. 
The effects that are fixed within each firm is controlled for in this model. Intuitively we 
argue that this will be the better approach compared to the OLS and RE. The RE model is 
more efficient (Wooldridge, 2014) only if all the data within each entity is random, which 
we have established that it is not. After estimating the FE model we can perform a Hausman 
test to investigate if fixed effects are present.  
Appendix A.12 displays results from running the FE model. We have incorporated the 
variables stepwise; to be able to look at the change each variable contributes. The 
coefficients in this model are interpreted as the percentage point change in the probability of 𝑦!!!   =   1, i.e. the change in the probability of going bankrupt. This is measured against the 
mean value of the sample, to get an idea of how much impact on the probabilities the 
variables have. The mean value for the probability of going bankrupt is in our sample is 
approximately 0.01. 
In order to take into consideration the time- and industry-specific fixed effects that we 
assume exists within our dataset we make use of the fixed effects transformation described in 
chapter 6.4, thus:  (𝑦!" − 𝑦!) = 𝛽!"(𝑋!" − 𝑋!)+ (𝜇!" − 𝜇!) 
And we can apply OLS to this equation and estimate the 𝛽! from our OLS as 𝛽!, 
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 1   𝑦!"!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛1+ 𝛽! ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜1+ 𝜇!"            ⋮       6 𝑦!"!! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛1+ 𝛽! ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜1+ 𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜1+ 𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜2+ 𝛽! ∗ 2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽!∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 5~9 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 10~25 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 26~ + 𝛽!"∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽!" ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽!"∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒!𝐸! +⋯+ 𝑒!𝐸! + 𝛿!𝑇! +⋯+ 𝛿!𝑇! + 𝑎!+ 𝜇!" 
Again 𝑦!"!! is the dependent variable for bankruptcy where I = entity and t = time. 𝑥!,!" 
represents the independent variables as seen in (6), 𝛽! is the coefficients for the the 
independent variables, 𝑎! + 𝜇!" is the error term, E is the entity n. Since the industry 
variables are binary we have n-1 entities included in the model. 𝑒! is the coefficient of the 
binary regressors (entities). 𝑇! is the binary variable for time, such that we have t-1 time 
periods. 𝛿! is the coefficient for the binary time regressors. Again, the intercept in the first 
(base) period is 𝛽! and that for the next period is 𝛽! + 𝛿!.  
We are then controlling for the average differences across industries in any observable or 
unobservable predictors, such as difference in the quality of firms, sophistication etc.  The 
new coefficients soak up all the across group action variation. The effects we are able to 
isolate from the FE-model are how internal rates are actually affecting the probability of a 
company going bankrupt, holding everything else constant.  
The last column (6) in the model is enhanced from the FE estimation one previous (5). Both 
of these models are included in the overview (appendix A.13). We have included an 
interaction term: 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏  𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 = 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓  𝒙  𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 
This dummy captures time specific events within each industry. The dummy takes on the 
value of 1 if the company is in a certain industry and in a certain year.  
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In the first column (1) in our FE table the results are reported for our key accounting figures 
following the discussion in the section on OLS. Profit margin 1 is significant at the 1 % 
level, showing a 0.001 percentage point increase in the probability of failure for a one unit 
change in the ratio for any given firm. This result is persistent throughout the introduction of 
more controls except for a small stepwise decrease in magnitude ending at 0.0005 in column 
(6). This indicates that the profit margin will increase the probability of bankruptcy, as the 
ratio becomes larger. The profit margin is measured as sales/total assets, and the 
interpretation of this is the same as in OLS. 
Liquidity ratio 1 shows a decrease of -0.002 percentage points for a given unit increase in the 
ratio. This is in thread with the OLS results after introducing the industry specific effects that 
are now also controlled for by the FE model. The liquidity of a company is necessary to meet 
obligations. This is important for short-term obligations, as they are due often within 1 year. 
To cover the longer obligations, companies have the option of turning illiquid assets into 
liquidity. These results prove that the more liquid a company is, the less of a probability of 
bankruptcy. The company must consider the trade-off between increasing liquidity and 
decrease the probability of bankruptcy, as they determine their strategy.  This is a part of the 
operations that the management are able to influence. 
Solidity ratio 1 has a decrease of -0.0002 percentage points for a given unit increase in the 
ratio, which is to say that increasing solidity is a good thing. The value is persistent 
throughout the model but never significant on anything else than the 10% level except when 
we include the interaction in (6), where it is significant on the 5% level. The FE model 
leaves decidedly more noise out of the error terms, as this figure was never significant in our 
initial OLS models although common sense says it should be. The percentage of equity the 
company has is impacting the ability to handle their debt claims. Banks often have a 
minimum equity percentage of total assets that the company needs to stay above to keep 
receiving credit. If a company is less leveraged, they have capital buffer in the form of equity 
in case of unforeseen events.  
Solidity ratio 2 is at first not significant (1) but takes on a value of -0.02 percentage points in 
the last model (6). This is an effective decrease in probability for bankruptcy for a unit 
increase in the ratio. This value increases upon adding the different controls when we are 
expanding the fixed effect model. The more assets that are a collateral to the creditors, the 
more solid the business. The ratio is mortgaged assets divided by collateral fixed assets. An 
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increase in this will strengthen the banks’ security of getting the loans repaid when they 
provide capital.  The interest rate on the loan may be lower due to a lower risk, and the banks 
are willing to provide higher loans.  
In column (2) we add the dummy for a 2-year deficit. This has an impact of a 0.02 
percentage point increase in the probability of going bankrupt for a change in status, at first 
then decreasing as we add more controls, ending up at 0.009 percentage points. This variable 
infers that if a company has a net loss in two consecutive years, the probability of 
bankruptcy increases. The net loss is a product of both income and the costs of the operation. 
There are many aspects that can be altered to improve the bottom line results.  
The variables that are not likely to change from one category to another, does not give us any 
additional information to this analysis. A potential limitation of FE is that we cannot assess 
the effect of variables that have little within-group variation, which applies to some of our 
variables. E.g., not many businesses change their status from small to large (or the other way 
around) within an industry. The interpretation of Size (1 if small) in column (3) becomes 
negative at first, then impossible to determine as we add the interaction variable. It is highly 
unlikely that being a small firm should decrease the probability of going bankrupt and we 
must forgo the FE model if we are to isolate this effect in particular. However, as shown, that 
would expose us to potential omitted variables and for the rest of the variables FE seems 
more efficient. Furthermore, we do not have to worry about unobservable factors that are 
correlated with the variables included in our regression. If we instead had developed a size 
variable based on e.g. the logarithm of sales income, we would be able to interpret the size 
effect in the FE-model. 
Upon adding the age categories in (4) we see that it might be the case that not sufficiently 
many firms change their age status either. Seeing how being an older firm now increases the 
risk of going bankrupt in reference to the youngest firms it would probably be a good idea to 
estimate the model with smaller intervals for age, or a continuous measure.  
Column (4) also introduces our growth variables, out of which only Growth revenue seem to 
be significantly different from zero (at the 10% level), having a -0.0000017 percentage point 
impact on the probability of going bankrupt for a unit change in the ratio. The lack of 
explanatory power in the growth variables is what surprised us most. Intuitively, we assumed 
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that expanding and growing was associated with some kind of extra risk. However, it does 
not look like the growth has any significant impact on the probability of bankruptcy. 
Hausman test 
The Hausman test is a way to formally test for statistically significant differences in the 
coefficient of the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2014).  The test proves if there is fixed 
effects in a panel data or not. Fixed effects are unobservable characteristics or unique errors 𝑢! that differ within each entity in the panel. If fixed effects are present in the data material 
that is modelled, then the fixed effects model (FE) is a better approach to get solid results. 
The results are more solid since the FE model captures these individual traits. 𝐻!: The regressors are not correlated with the unobservable characteristics and the preferred 
model is random effects model (RE). 𝐻!: The regressors are correlated with the unobservable characteristics, and the preferred 
model is fixed effects model (FE). 
The models that we have estimated include a fixed effects model and a random effects 
model. Our sample consists of data sorted by different organization numbers, and we have 
assumed that there is fixed effects within each company that affect the result.  Each company 
may have individual features that could impact on their probability of default. This could be 
due to employees, internal procedures, management and so on.  To test this hypothesis, we 
have used the Hausman test which gives us a chi-squared value of 0.000. This indicates that 
our hypothesis is correct. There are fixed effects within the panels that have to be controlled 
for. The FE model in our results is therefore likely to be more efficient. 
6.5 Comparison of the models 
We find that many of the results as to what factors determine bankruptcy are similar across 
the different models, which in itself is a validation of each measure. The fixed effects model 
incorporates the causes of changes within a firm. Comparing it to the OLS, we see that the 
interpretation of some key figures change, which is a sign that FE is a better fit. Intuitively 
the FE results also outperforms the ones from the RE, which leads us to prefer the FE in this 
case too. The Hausman test confirms this. Together with the fixed effects model, we believe 
the results from the logistic regression provide us with a good insight. By controlling for 
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external circumstances, the model is able to estimate the financial measures, and measure 
how large impact they have on the probability of bankruptcy. 
Across all models, neither of the growth variables are significant, and we cannot say how 
company growth has impact on its probability of going bankrupt, if indeed at all. 
The profit margin is significant throughout all of the models. One should be careful about 
increasing the ratio on the wrong terms. The fraction is part of two different aspects related 
to bankruptcy, hence upping sales is ok but scaling down assets is not. 
We have a liquidity ratio that changes the sign in front of the coefficient as we include it in 
different estimation models. The sign in RE is positive, but in the rest of the models it is 
negative, i.e. an increase in liquidity is lowering the probability of bankruptcies. This makes 
us suspicious the RE model cannot be trusted. 
Solidity ratio 1 is not significant until we control for fixed effects. This is a ratio that 
incorporates a lot of information about a company’s financial state. Solidity ratio 2 has a 
very low magnitude of the coefficient, but also this ratio increases the significance level 
when we control for fixed effects.  
To avoid bankruptcy, companies should avoid running consecutive deficits. This ratio shows 
an increase in the probability in all of the models we have estimated. 
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7. Predictions and evaluation 
7.1 Predicting bankruptcy 
In order to evaluate the accuracy of our model we use categorical regression analysis on a 
variable Z that indicates bankruptcy. In the dataset we have previously ran regressions on the 
variable already defined as:  
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡  
The model that we want to estimate sets Bankrupt as Z and looks like the specification by 
Ohlson (1980): 𝑍 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐹! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝐹! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐹! +   𝜀 
Where  𝛽!,𝛽!,…,  𝛽!	  are regression coefficients and  𝜀 denotes the error term. 
In the logit model, Z then denotes the probability of bankruptcy: 𝑝 = 𝑝 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 = 1 𝑍) = 𝐹(𝑍)    
Where F is a cumulative distribution (increasing between 0 and 1), which is to say that we 
have a probability for bankrupcy: 𝑝 = 𝐹(𝛽! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐹! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝐹! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐹!) 
In order to find p, we assume this cumulative distribution is logistically distributed, i.e.:	  
𝐹 𝑍 = 𝑒!1+ 𝑒 
Such that our probability p can be allowed to be: 
𝑝 = 11+ 𝑒!! 
(while Z is still equal to:  𝛽! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐹! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝐹! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐹!). Z is given by the logistical 
regression. A higher Z means probability p is higher too.  
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The two categories can be grouped from the critical value    𝑝∗      𝑖𝑓  𝑝   ≤   𝑝∗ this means a firm 
is categorized as credit worthy and grouped as 0. Whereas in the other case, where 𝑝   ≥   𝑝∗ it 
is grouped as 1 and described as a probable bankrupcy. Alternatively we can categorize 
based on 𝑍∗ which is given by: 
p∗ = 11+   e!!∗ 
If Z  ≤ 𝑍∗ then a firm is credit worthy and grouped as 0. If Z > 𝑍∗ this means it is grouped as 
1 and described as a probable bankrupcy. Here high Z is a sign of danger. 𝑍∗ is estimated by 
our model. 3 
This table is an overview of the models predictions and the correct values. We want the 
model to estimate as low number of “false” as possible. 
Table 5: Predicting errors 
 Predicted= 1 Predicted= 0 
Correct =1 True False 
Correct =0 False True 
 𝐻!: A company is likely to go bankrupt, =1 𝐻!: A company is not likely to go bankrupt, =0 
Type 1 errors occur when the null hypothesis is rejected, but it is in fact true (Smith, 2011). 
In our case this would be predicting that a company are not likely to go bankrupt, when in 
reality they are.   
Type 2 errors occur when we are not rejecting the null hypothesis, when the alternative 
hypothesis is true (Smith, 2011). In our case this would be predicting that a company are 
likely to go bankrupt, when in the reality they are not. 
                                                
3 Each categorization can be done in one estimation using Stata’s estat classification after running the logit  
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7.2 Evaluation and prediction using logit 
The logistic model gives the percentage probability of a company going bankrupt. This is 
only meaningful information if the model gives a valid number of correct estimations. We 
are testing our model against the data we have to evaluate if we can predict bankruptcies 
accurately for our dataset. We want to find the percentage of prediction that is correct.  
To evaluate the competency of our logit model, we needed to find a probability cut-off as to 
how we wanted to classify companies as bankrupt or not. To find this cut-off point, we 
estimate the specificity/sensitivity trade-off (A.14 in appendix).4  The two functions are 
crossing at the point where misclassifications are in a steady state. 
The prediction fares rather well (A.15), and we can safely assume that our fixed effects 
approach has enabled us to identify good measures that determine bankruptcy. There is a 
total percentage of correct classifications in the logistic model of 74,22 %. Nevertheless, as 
the literature warns, anyone using the regression approaches of this model must keep in mind 
the 25,75% that the model will predict falsely. This logistic regression does not incorporate 
fixed effects in estimating the probabilities. It may be possible to improve on these results 
using a logistic regression that controls for this.  
 
 
                                                
4 Stata’s lsens command does this for us 
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8. Discussion and summary 
8.1 Criticism of the estimated models 
The models we have formulated must be used with caution. The results can give a company 
insight as to which factors that are contributing to a higher risk of failure, but the complexity 
of this issue makes these types of models to some degree uncertain. It is impossible to 
control for every factor that may contribute to a higher risk of bankruptcy.  
Due to differences in reporting the data, we had to prepare it by making some assumptions. 
Bankruptcies were reported either on the same year as the companies last active year, or in 
one of the previous years. To be able to do the analysis, we had to set the bankruptcy date to 
one year after the last active year for all companies. In our estimation, these kinds of 
assumptions may have influenced the results to some extent. The dependent variable was a 
binary dummy variable, which considered if the company was bankrupt/not bankrupt. In 
regards to our OLS, RE and FE approach it is evident that linear estimations suffer from 
logical constraints, such as predicting probabilities outside the probability range, something 
the logit does not do.  
The fixed effects models also show some limitations when it comes to determining the 
impact of size on the probability of a company going bankrupt. Regardless, we have found 
that small companies have a higher probability than large. This seems to be a solid result. 
However, the size variable is only divided in two categories and could give a more nuanced 
view if the model was estimated with more fragmented size categories. The same goes for 
the variable age. We have estimated the model with age categories, but if the model included 
a continuous measure for age we would be able to get the “per year change” effect. 
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8.2 Suggestions for further research 
The estimations applied controls for other factors than pure financial measure. It would be 
interesting to expand on this, so that it includes additional perspectives that could affect the 
probability of bankruptcy. Ideally, a fixed effects model that takes the binary nature of our 
data into consideration.  
Some research based on industries has been done in this thesis. An elaboration on industry 
specific estimation models could provide more information about the differences. Some 
industries are densely clustered in the same geographical areas in Norway. E.g. the oil sector 
has a large percentage of their operations in Stavanger, the Shipping industry in Bergen, the 
finance sector is clustered in the larger cities, the aluminium production is concentrated in 
Sogn & Fjordane, and the fishing industry is located at the coast etc. It is possible to analyse 
whether industry or geographical aspects have an impact in determining bankruptcy 
probabilities. 
The period our data material is based on, is from the years 2005-2012. Developing a model 
using longer panels would make it less biased by the years of the financial crisis. In our 
model these years are a large part of the total sample, and even though we are controlling for 
year specific effects as well as year specific shocks the companies were in this period largely 
impacted by the stress of the crisis. Many employees were let go, and skills and knowledge 
may have been lost during this period.  
Given that we find different attributes that are beneficial in both the logit and the FE, a 
suggestion for further research is a combination of these models. There exists a logistic 
regression model that is specified for panel data.5 The logistic regression will then take into 
consideration the fixed effects present in the panel. This estimation process will be 
computationally demanding, especially with such a large dataset. We believe it will identify 
much of the same factors, but may yield more accurate predictions. 
                                                
5 The command for this model is xtlogit in Stata 
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8.3 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to identify the impact of the factors that are present in 
determining the probability of corporate bankruptcy. The emphasis was laid on how fixed 
effects influence the estimation approach. We uncover differences as to what internal factors 
explains the probability of bankruptcy depending on which model we use in estimating. We 
were able to find some general results, as we measured many of the variables as ratios, 
giving us comparable output. 
The data we uncover on company characteristics appear to be in line with previous findings. 
The models prove that the probability of bankruptcy falls as the company becomes larger 
and older. The FE model was not the best to describe the latter, as it only estimates 
coefficients for firms that change their status within the time period. It is not very often a 
company changes their size and age. The logit model was a better approach to analyse these 
factors. We found a diminishing probability as the company grew older, and that a small 
company is approximately twice as likely to go bankrupt as a big company according to our 
odds ratio output. 
The accounting data also provided us with insights. Initially we had many primary variables 
that we expected to be relevant. After the selection process we were left with the final 
accounting variables to be analysed. When analysing the profit margin we expected the 
variable to reduce the probability of bankruptcy as the ratio got higher. However, the results 
are opposite. The profit margin is a fraction, and a product of both sales income and total 
assets. Even if sales income goes up, it does not weigh up for when assets are decreasing, 
and hence the ratio goes up. The probability actually becomes higher when the ratio 
increases. 
The liquidity ratio is a measure of how much liquidity a company has. Our initial beliefs 
about this ratio were that it should decrease the probability of bankruptcy. It should be 
beneficial to be more liquid, as the company has better chance of covering their obligations. 
The sign of this coefficient is negative in both the logit model and in the fixed effects model, 
and thus confirming this belief. The coefficient in the logit model is not significant though. 
The same applies to the equity ratio Solidity 1. It is negative in both the logit model (not 
significant) and in the FE. The reason for this is that in the FE model we are also controlling 
for firm-specific attributes. This means that even controlling for things like management, 
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operational systems and so on, the liquidity ratio and Solidity 1 still makes the probability of 
default decrease. Incorporating the fixed effects is better than using the logit when analysing 
the accounting ratios. 
The net loss dummy that measures a 2-year deficit proved to be significant and positive, i.e. 
gives a higher probability of a default. The result is logical, since the company is losing 
money. The odd ratios gave us a numeric value on how much the impact is, and the company 
is almost 4.7 times more likely to go bankrupt if they run a deficit for two years. 
To summarize, we find the logistic model appropriate when we are looking at how the age 
and the size of a company affect the probability of bankruptcy. However, the fixed effects 
model is superior when it comes to estimating the factors that affect the probability of 
bankruptcy based on accounting ratios.  
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Appendix 
A.1 Bankrupt firms distributed by age 
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A.2 Bankruptcies 2008/2009 
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A.3 Bankruptcies by industry, Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) 
01 Agriculture and hunting 
02 Forestry and logging 
05 Fishing, fish farming, incl.services 
10 Coal mining and peat extraction 
11 Oil and gas extraction, incl.serv. 
12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
13 Mining of metal ores 
14 Other mining and quarrying 
15 Food products and beverages 
16 Tobacco products 
17 Textile products 
18 Wearing apparel., fur 
19 Footwear and leather products 
20 Wood and wood products 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 
22 Publishing, printing, reproduction 
23 Refined petroleum products 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 
25 Rubber and plastic products 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 
27 Basic metals 
28 Fabricated metal products 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
30 Office machinery and computers 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus 
32 Radio, TV sets, communication equip 
33 Instruments, watches and clocks 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-tr. 
35 Other transport equipment 
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 
37 Recycling 
40 Electricity, gas and steam supply 
41 Water supply 
45 Construction 
50 Motor vehicle services 
51 Wholesale trade, commision trade 
52 Retail trade, repair personal goods 
55 Hotels and restaurants 
60 Land transport, pipeline transport 
61 Water transport 
62 Air transport 
63 Supporting transport activities 
64 Post and telecommunications 
65 Financial intermediation, less ins. 
66 Insurance and pension funding 
67 Auxiliary financial intermediation 
70 Real estate activities 
71 Renting of machinery and equipment 
72 Computers and related activities 
73 Research and development 
74 Other business activities 
75 Public administration and defence 
80 Education 
85 Health and social work 
90 Sewage, refuse disposal activities 
        92 Cultural and sporting activities 
93 Other service activities 
95 Domestic services 
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A.4 Bankruptcies by Size 
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A.5 Mean of Liquidity ratios 
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A.6 Mean of Profitability measures 
 
A.7 Mean of Profitability 1 
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A.8 Mean of Solidity measures 
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A.9 Mean of Growth ratios 
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A.10 Regression estimates (OLS)   
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A.11 Logistic regression with odds ratios 
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A.12 Regression estimates (FE) 
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A.13 Regression estimates of OLS, logit, RE and FE 
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A.14 lsens output 
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A.15 estat classification output 
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